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RECENT DECISIONS
A PROPOSED STEP TowARD REASONED ADJUDICATION OF
FLICT OF LAWS

TORTS

IN THE CON-

Throughout the United States "the law of the place of wrong"' generally
has been mechanically applied to determine the substantive law governing
action in tort.2 It has been suggested that this rule has settled upon the courts
a formula for expeditious but not always just settlement of choice-of-law problems.3 In the interest of doing justice between parties certain exceptions have
been carved out of the rule. Until recently these exceptions were centered in the
areas of maritime 4 and workmen's compensation law. 5 No reason of significant
1. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 378 (1934).
2. See Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1266, 1268 n.1 (1961). See also Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws 7 (3d ed. 1949); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 130 (1961); Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1266 (1961);
11 Am. Jur. Conflict oj Laws § 182 (1937).
The theory ... is that, although the act complained of was subject to no
law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligato, which,
like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the
person may be found . . . . But as the only source of this obligation is the law
of the place of the act, it follows that the law determines, not merely the existence
of the obligation, . . . but equally determines its extent.
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904); accord, .Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222
U.S. 473 (1912); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914); Spokane &
Inland Empire R.R. v. Whitley, 237 U.S. 487 (1915).
There has been a considerable amount of criticism of the approach taken in the
Slater case. See, e.g., Cook, The Logical and Legal Basis of the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale
L.J. 457 (1924).
3. See Cook, supra note 2; Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963
Duke L.J. 1; Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-The Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58
Mich. L. Rev. 637 (1960); Ehrenzweig, Alienation of Affections in the Conflict of Laws,
45 Cornell L.Q. 514 (1960); Ehrenzweig, Lex Fori-Exception or Rule?, 32 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 13 (1959); Ehrenzweig, Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under "Forseeable
and Insurable Laws" (pts. 1-3), 69 Yale L.J. 595, 794, 978 (1959); Ehrenzweig, Parental
Immunity in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 23 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 474. (1956); Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts:
Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1951); Ford, Interspousal
Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the
Restatement, 15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 397 (1954); Stumberg, "The Place of the Wrong" Torts
and the Conflict of Laws, 34 Wash. L. Rev. 388 (1959).
4. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (Jones
Act not applied to Spanish citizen injured aboard Spanish ship while in American territorial
waters); Farmer v. Standard Dredging Corp., 167 F. Supp. 381 (D. Del. 1958) (Venezuelan
law not applied to U.S. citizen injured aboard vessel of U.S. registry while in Venezuelan
waters).
5. In these cases the ultimate answer was to break away from both tort and contract characterizations, and to hold that location of the employer-employee status
is the crucial fact. Arnold v. Industrial Comm'n, 21 Ill. 2d 57, 171 N.E.2d 26
(1961) (Illinois law not applied though injury suffered there, because employeremployee status centered in Alabama).
Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 1961 Ann. Survey Am. L. 29, 42 n.76; see Alaska Packers Ass'n
v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Nashko v. Standard Water Proofing
Co., 4 N.Y.2d 199, 149 N.E.2d 859, 173 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1958); 2 Larson, Workmen's
Compensation Law §§ 86-87 (1952); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 212-23 (2d ed. 1951);
Cowan, Jr., ExtraterritorialApplication of Workmen's Compensation Laws-A Suggested
Solution, 33 Texas L. Rev. 917 (1955). See also Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp., 348
U.S. 66 (1954) (commercial insurance). See generally Laufer, Torts and Workmen's
Compensation, 1962 Survey of New York Law, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 309 (1963).
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importance appears to deter courts from taking a reasoned approach toward
the prevailing lex loci delicti rule. But tradition has a way of hardening. Movement in this area has been slow and cautious on the part of the courts. Nevertheless, some decisions of the past decade point to an improved treatment for
conflict of laws problems arising in actions for personal injury.0
In New York the now famous case of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, lnc.7
evidenced a unique deviation from what has been described as "a choice-of-law
8
rule derived from . . . Ice Age of conflict of laws jurisprudence." The decedent, Kilberg, was a New York resident. He purchased a ticket in New York
for passage on a plane which began its flight from New York. The plane crashed
at a completely fortuitous site, located in Massachusetts. Kilberg was survived
by dependents who will undoubtedly continue to find their support within
New York where they were living at the time of his death. The action was
predicated on two counts, one upon the Massachusetts wrongful death statute9
and the other upon breach of contract for safe carriage arising out of the
carrier-passenger relation consummated in New York. The breach of contract
count was dismissed. 10 Although that left plaintiff's success to rest on the
Massachusetts wrongful death statute the New York Court of Appeals avoided
that statute's $15,000 limitation of recovery provision on the ground of public
policy as well as by characterizing the measure of damages as procedural."
Exactly seventeen months later the procedural characterization was withdrawn
in Davenport v. Webb,' 2 leaving Kilberg as authority indicative of the importance attributed to a state's public policy for the benefit of its citizens.
At the time of Kilberg there was little doubt that where a state had a
genuine interest, application of its public policy was not constitutionally prohibited by the full faith and credit clause. 13 But subsequently in a similar case,
6. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961) (Massachusetts limitation on wrongful death damages rejected); Haumerschild
v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (question of interspousal
immunity considered family law rather than tort law); Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp.,
27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958) (question of interspousal immunity logically determined by
reference to law of family domicile); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376,
82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) (express rejection of principles in Restatement, Conflict of Laws
§§ 377-78 under circumstances of action premised on dramshop act); Emery v. Emery, 49
Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (question of parental immunity logically determined by
reference to law of family domicile); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944
(1953) (locus delicti rule rejected in determining whether personal injury claim survives
tortfeasor). See also Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the
Conflict of Laws, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205 (1958) (discussing Grant v. McAuliffe, supra).
7. Supra note 6. Student commentators have given the case varying degrees of both
favorable and critical attention in at least twenty law reviews. The majority have been
critical. A nearly exhaustive collection of the citations appears in Pearson v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 556 n.7 (2d Cir. 1962).
8. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 7, at 557.
9. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 229, § 2 (1958), amended to raise limit to $20,000, Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 299, § 2 (1960).
10. See text at notes 84 & 85 infra.
11. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 40-42, 172 N.E.2d 526, 528-29. 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 136-37 (1961).
12. 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962); 14 Syracuse L. Rev.
106 (1962).
13. Comment, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1497, 1499 n.14 (1961).
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Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., a federal court decided that where state
policies conflict it was violative of the "'strong, unifying principle'" of the full
faith and credit clause for the forum state to allow its policy to control. 14 Upon
rehearing en banc the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the
prior panel decision and held "that the ruling of the New York Court of
Appeals in Kilberg was a proper exercise of the state's power to develop conflict of laws doctrine."'1 It was a constitutional exercise of the state's power to
refuse to apply the Massachusetts provision limiting recovery.
In the recent case of Babcock v. Jackson,'6 a guest passenger in an automobile owned and operated by the decedent instituted an action against decedent's executrix for personal injuries arising out of a one car accident which
occurred in the Province of Ontario, Canada. The parties are residents of
Rochester, New York, where the trip began. Although the complaint does not
allege that the automobile was insured in accordance with New York compulsory
insurance law, it may fairly be presumed.' 7 Defendant's motion to dismiss was
granted by the New York Supreme Court, Monroe County, on the ground that
recovery was barred by the Ontario guest statute.' 8 The Appellate Division
affirmed per curiam, Justice Halpern dissenting. 19
The English choice-of-law rule for determining liability in tort is opposed
to that which now prevails in the United States. 20 Based on both the lex fori
and lex loci delicti, the English rule was formulated in the case of Phillips v.
Eyre.21 It permits a foreign act to be litigated under the law of the forum
provided the act is not justifiable under the law of the place of perpetration.2
Thus, for the protection of the defendant the lex loci delicti is recognized as a
23
defense.
14. 307 F.2d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1962), reversing 199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
The court quoted from Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951).
15. 309 F.2d 553, 556 (2d Cir. 1962); cf. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1,
12-13 (1961).
16. 17 A.D.2d 694, 230 N.Y.S.2d 114 (4th Dep't 1962) (instant case).
17. Id. at 699, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
18. Highway Traffic Act, Rev. Stat. Ont. 1950, c. 167, § 50(2):
Notwithstanding subsection 1, the owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other
than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers for compensation,
shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the
death of any person being carried in, or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or
alighting from the motor vehicle.
Although the latter section differs only slightly from Highway Traffic Act, Rev. Stat.
Ont. 1960, c. 172, § 105(2), cited 17 A.D.2d at 695, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 115, it should be noted
that it was the 1950 Revision which was in effect when the accident occurred in September
1960. See Proclamation, 5 Rev. Stat. Ont. 1960, 311-12. See also The Statutes Revision Act,
1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 94, § 3 (Ont. Can.).
19. 17 A.D.2d 694, 230 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (4th Dep't 1962) (dissenting opinion).
20. Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 2, at 262; Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 5, at 181.
See generally Cheshire, Private International Law 367-91 (3d ed. 1947) (discussing the
English rule) ; Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 5, at 181-201.
21. [1870] 6 Q.B. 1, 28-29. See also The Halley, 2 P.C. 193 (1868).
22. Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2 Q.B. 231 (English law applied to determine tort
liability for Brazilian libel where under law of Brazil the only sanction was criminal).
For a criticism of the decision see Cheshire, op. dt. supra note 20, at 378-79.
23. See Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws 5-12 (1942).
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In Machado v. Fontes24 recovery in tort was allowed where the locus delicli
provided no basis for a civil action. Professor Ehrenzweig has approved of that
decision and comments that only a vested rights approach could question its
soundness. 25 Time, however, has sapped the vested rights theory of its vitality. 20
Such an approach leads to the attractive doctrine that the only source of
obligation is the law of the place where the tort occurred. The notion is that
law has only territorial operation and as a consequence the forum is required
to enforce a foreign cireated right if it is to give any relief at all. It would
follow that the lex loci delicti should determine both the existence and extent
of the duty. The attraction in this approach lies in the fact that it leads to a
mechanistic solution, usually easy to apply. Part of its weakness is inherent in
the same quality, however. "[I] s it inherently probable that courts will achieve
socially desirable results if they apply the same conflicts rule to liability for
automobile negligence, radio defamation, escaping animals, the seduction of
women, economic conspiracies, and conversion? .. . [T]he social factors involved differ too fundamentally for that."2 7 Furthermore, the proposition that
the only source of obligation is the law of the place of the tort will not stand
inspection. More than one state or nation may have an interest in the act
committed. Courts and legislatures may take cognizance of the act as well as
its consequences and it is conceivable that they could occur in different places. 28
The prevailing rule in the United States for establishing liability for
foreign torts is a remnant of the discarded doctrine of vested rights. The
American rule diverged from a choice of law principle which took the lex fori
as a starting point. An era of ambivalence was accompanied by publication
of the eighth edition of Story's treatise on conflict of laws.29 In that edition a
footnote appearing in a criminal context 30 contained the first treatise statement
of the lex loci delicti rule, based on a dictum in Dennick v. Railroad Co.3'
Notwithstanding it was in contradiction of the lex Jori rule formerly applied
to foreign torts,32 courts apparently paid scant attention to the logical limits
of its application. It seems that the rule must have been intended for choice-oflaw cases involving moral wrongs, to effect a purpose similar to the English
24.
25.
(1960).

Supra note 22.
Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 Yale L.J. 595, 597 n,15

26. See Carswell, The Doctrine of Vested Rights in Private International Law, 8
Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 268 (1959); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their
Role and Utility, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 379-85 (1945). See generally Cook supra note 2.
27. Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881, 884 (1951).
28. See Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws §§ 43e-f (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
See also Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 382 (1934); Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 5, at
201-03.
29. See Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 Yale L.J. 595, 597,
598 & n.25 (1960).
30. Story, Conflict of Laws 845 n. (8th ed. 1883).
31. 103 U.S. 11, 18 (1880). The case concerned litigation commenced in New York
on a wrongful death action which occurred under New Jersey law. The Court said that
New York could not deny relief merely because the action was based upon a foreign
statute rather than common law.
32. E.g., Anderson v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 37 Wis. 321 (1875).
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exception which allows certain defenses that would be available where the
wrong was committed.3 3 It is undoubtedly true that the rule produced desirable
results in some cases outside of the moral wrong category, probably accounting
for the consequence that its application generalized before shortcomings were
perceived.
Despite this setting the American Law Institute adopted the rule for
general application to torts. 34 It is beyond doubt that the Restatement imparted
an aura of credence to the rule and led many courts to apply it with dogmatic
consistency.3 5 Now that the shortcomings are patent it is not surprising that
courts find difficulty in explaining deviation from the course that has been
sef. "It is illustrative of an unsettled attitude . . . which induces . . . [our
courts] to seize on artificialities as means for reaching and superficially explaining what are otherwise good results." 36 The reasoning used by the New
York Court of Appeals to arrive at a good result in Kilberg is an excellent
example of that uneasiness. A few courts, however, have found it impossible
to do justice to the parties under the pale of the Restatement rule and have
37
made a qualified retreat from it.
The first cogent formulation of the New York rule for ascertaining the
liability in actions upon foreign torts was stated
applicable law to determine
38
in McDonald v. Mallory.
The liability of a person for his acts depends, in general, upon the laws
of the place where the acts were committed, and although a civil right
of action acquired, or liability incurred, in one State or country for a
personal injury may be enforced in another to which the parties may
remove or where they be found, yet the right89 or liability must exist
under the laws of the place where act was done.
40
This rule was said to apply whether the acts were "wrongful or negligent"
and it seems to have been so applied. 41 The rule, however, is not entirely
33. Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 Yale L.J. 595, 598 (1960).
34. Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 377-78 (1934). For a brief survey of the
background leading to the 1934 Restatement rule see Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the
Conflict of Laws, 69 Yale L.J. 595, 596-98 (1960). There is further discussion on the
adoption of the rule by the restaters in Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional
Multistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 6-14 (1951).
35. See Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934) (citing to an
early draft of the Restatement); Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, 266 N.Y. 244,
194 N.E. 692 (1935). In the latter case the court was quick to cite the A.LJ. Proposed

Restatement rather than to arrive at the same result by the more flexible rule of earlier
New York cases such as McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N.Y. 546 (1879).
36. Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 1961 Ann. Survey Am. L. 29, 43.
37. Note 6 supra. See also Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 7, at 559.
38. 77 N.Y. 546 (1879).
39. Id. at 550-51; accord, Wooden v. Western N.Y. & Pa. R.R., 126 N.Y. 10 (1891).
40. Wooden v. Western N.Y. & Pa. R.R., supranote 39, at 14 (dictum).
41. See Crashley v. Press Publishing Co., 179 N.Y. 27, 71 N.E. 258 (1904) (wrongful
act: court assumed without discussion that New York law determined whether plaintiff in
Brazil had been libeled per se by article published in New York); Consolidated Coppermines
Corp. v. Nevada Consol. Copper Co., 127 Misc. 71, 215 N.Y. Supp. 265 (Sup. Ct. 1926)

(wrongful act: court assumed without discussion that Nevada law applied to action for
removal of ore in that state but merits not decided for want of jurisdiction); see, e.g.,
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without limitation. In the absence of contrary statutory policy at the forum,

courts will refuse to enforce foreign penal 42 or fiscal laws and New York
courts sometimes refuse to take cognizance of suits for injury to land located

without the state43 in spite of the fact that the common-law rule" has been
45
changed in New York by statute.
Public policy40 and dissimilarity 47 are other grounds that have been

invoked to refuse relief when the applicable foreign law was anathema to the

court. The dissimilarity position is analogous to public policy but "at the
present day . . . is probably retained only in Texas and Maryland."4 8 For
New York the turning point occurred when the highest court of the state
abandoned the similarity test in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.40 The actual
rationale that caused courts to deny relief when the law of the place was
dissimilar to the law of the forum seems to have been public policy. Some
decisions have been made on the ground of public policy alone but their in-

frequency attests caution on the part of courts when using a rule that is
highly susceptible to opinion and whim.50
The lex loci delicti rule has evoked an increasing amount of criticism

from legal scholars,5 1 but courts, for the most part, continue to accept the
principle without giving consideration to the question whether " a determination
to the opposite effect would be more in conformity with principles of equity

and justice." 52 Indeed, an English authority on conflict of laws observed in
1951 that "it seems extraordinary that there should be . . . so much uncritical
Johnson v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 197 N.Y. 316, 90 N.E. 953 (1910) (negligent act: action
under Canadian death statute).
42. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (taking
narrow interpretation of the word penal) ; Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 5, at 172-74, 199.
43. See Consolidated Coppermines Corp. v. Nevada Consol. Copper Co., supra note 41.
44. See generally Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 5, at 174-76.
45. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1913, ch. 76 (now N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 536).
46. See generally Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 Colum.
L. Rev. 969 (1956).
47. See generally Hancock, op. cit. supra note 23, at 26-29; Paulsen & Sovern, supra
note 46, at 975-76.
48. Hancock, op. cit. supra note 23, at 29 and n.13. But see Stumberg, su pra note 3,
at 389 n.6: "It might be added that formerly American courts frequently stated that no
effect would be given at the forum to foreign law if that law is substantially different
from the law at the forum. This notion seems to have survived only in Texas and there
only as to Mexican law."
49. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918); 32 Harv. L. Rev. 172 (1919); 28 Yale L.

67 (1918).
50. See Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 5, at 198-99. See also Restatement, Conflict
of Laws §§ 382, 612 .(1934); Restatement, 1948 Supplement § 612, comment a. As to the
position of New York law at the time the Restatement of Conflict of Laws was formulated
see Restatement, Conflict of.Laws-New York Annotations §§ 377-79, 612 (1935).
51. See, e.g., Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 201-12 (2d ed. 1951); Currie, Survival
of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 209
(1958); Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 881 (1951); Stumberg,
"The Place of the Wrong" Torts and the Conflict of Laws, 34 Wash. L. Rev. 388 (1959).
Other pertinent articles are cited in the instant case passim.
52. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 380, 82 N.W.2d 365, 368 (1957)
(rejecting the Restatement rule).
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acceptance of the rule that tort liability is governed by the law of the place
of the wrong." 53
Adherence to the rule by which courts almost invariably would apply the
law of the place of injury54 is not without recommending features, however.r5
Because it is the prevailing American rule for determining applicable substantive law, it approaches the legal virtue of uniformity. It has the added
advantage of being easy for both lawyer and judge to apply in making the
initial requisite determination of applicable law. As a result it facilitates
prediction, thereby aiding attorneys to counsel effectively, clients and bodies
politic to save money and courts either to avoid altogether or to dispose more
quickly of tort litigation involving a choice-of-law issue. As a further consideration it has been proposed that "fairness to the parties requires that the
fortuitous choice of a geographical place of suit should, as far as possible, not
vary the way in which the suit will be decided." 50 It seems, however, that the
latter consideration is of little weight because it is susceptible to counterbalance by noting that the place of the injury may be at least equally fortuitous.
Furthermore, pragmatic virtues and underlying theory cannot support a rule
of law if justice to the parties does not result.5 7 That mechanical formulae
cannot always be employed effectively to determine which state's law should
apply was recognized in Vaston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green,55 a
case involving contractual obligation. In the opinion of the Court by Mr.
Justice Black: "Determination requires the exercise of an informed judgment
in the balancing of all the interests of the states with the most significant contacts in order to best accommodate the equities among the parties to the
policies of those states." 59 Although the significant contacts approach may
not be a panacea for tort problems it should not be denied that the balancing
of interests is applicable to torts as well as to contracts.
An infinite number of hypothetical situations could be posed to show the
weakness of the present rule. It might stimulate the imagination to observe a
few of the tort circumstances where strict application of the law of the place
of injury may have produced questionable results. Multiple contact cases, 0
53. Morris, supra note 51, at 883.
54. See also Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 382, 612 (1934).
55. The place of injury generally has been accepted as the place of the wrong because
injury is the last event necessary to give rise to tort liability. See Restatement, op. cit.

supra note 54, § 377.

56. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 7 (3d ed. 1949).

57. See Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 Duke LJ. 1, 38;

Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 51, at 201.

58. 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
59. Id. at 162.
60. The law of the place of the wrong has been applied to determine liability for
a New Jersey automobile bailor when the bailee caused injury in New York. Young v.
Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933); 47 Harv. L. Rev. 349 (1933); 18 Minn. L. Rev. 350 (1934).
But in Levey v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 308 Conn. 333, 143 Atl. 163 (1928),
the Connecticut court held the law of the place of the bailment, Connecticut, applicable
on a contract ground. In a different situation, an action for libel, a forum opened itself
365
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guest statutes,' 1 survivorship statutes, 62 the single publication rule that some
states apply to libel,6 3 community property states0 4 and interspousal liability
versus common-law disability6 5 are among those circumstances.
In the past eight years the highest courts of four states have reached
decisions that rebut the pervasive grip of the Restatement rule in automobile
liability contexts.es It is hoped that other courts will take cognizance of those
decisions "at least where the protection of citizens of the forum state so
requires. They will then cease to deprive passengers in fully insured cars of
their claims against the insurers . . . by virtue of a totally unwarranted
reference to the law of a fortuitous place of accident." 07 New York seems
to be flirting with the modern professorial approach in this area of the law0"
but has not yet taken a position as clear as that of the Minnesota court in
Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc.69
A critique of the instant case cannot afford to ignore Justice Halpern's
vigorous and scholarly dissent.70 As Professor Currie has indicated, that
opinion invokes at least five bases of varying utility in an attempt to entice
other members of the judiciary down a new path to an opposite result.71
Those bases are the Kilberg precedent, "center of gravity" or "most significant
to a possible multiplicity of suits by applying the lex locus delicti when some places of
injury did not follow a single publication rule but the forum did. Hartmann v. Time,
Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948). But cf. Crashley v. Press
Publishing Co., 179 N.Y. 27, 71 N.E. 258 (1904) (without discussion the court applied
New York libel law despite injury alleged in Brazil). See generally Hancock, Torts in
the Conflict of Laws 192-256 (1942).
61. See generally Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws, 69 Yale LJ.
595 (1960).
62. See Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 Atl. 691 (1929); 28 Colum. L. Rev. 798
(1928); 26 Mich. L. Rev. 932 (1928), 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 996 (1928). But see Grant v.
McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). See also Restatement, Conflict of Laws
§ 390 (1934).
63. See Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1948); 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1460
(1948).
64. See Traglio v. Harris, 104 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1939); 13 S. Cal. L. Rev. 503
(1940).
65. See generally Ford, 'Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 397 (1954).
66. Ehrenzweig, supra note 61, at 602; see Haumerschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7
Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (question of interspousal immunity considered family
law rather than tort law); Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958)
(question of interspousal immunity logically determined by reference to law of family
domicile); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) (express
rejection of principles in Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 377, 378 (1934), under circumstances of action premised on dramshop act); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289
P.2d 218 (1955) (question of parental immunity logically determined by reference to law
of family domicile).
67. Ehrenzweig, supra note 61, at 602 (footnote omitted).
68. Compare Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) with Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230
N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
69. 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957); see Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 1962 Survey
of N.Y. Law, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 147, 158-59 (1962). See also Stumberg, "The Place of
the Wrong" Torts and the Conflict of Laws, 34 Wash. L. Rev. 388, 391 (1959) (discussing
the Schmidt case).
10. Supra note 19.
71. Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 Duke L.J. 1, 34.
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contacts" theory, contract arising out of the host-passenger relationship
consummated in New York, the English rule and renvoi or whole law applica72
tion.
Taking this case on an ad hoc basis there are numerous factors to indicate
that a dismissal of the complaint does not contribute to justice between the
parties. The alleged negligence occurred while New York residents were
traveling in a car owned and operated by one of them. That vehicle was
presumably of New York registration, insured in accordance with the compulsory insurance law. 73 Under these circumstances it could not have been
within the travelers' expectations that each time they crossed political boundaries
their legal relationship might be altered significantly. Assureds are at least
indirectly aware that their automobile liability insurance does not terminate
upon leaving the state. Modern conditions make travel without the state a
commonplace occurrence and automobile owners know that they are not
expected to purchase separate policies to obtain liability coverage in other
political territories. Similarily, residents are generally aware that state law
assures them of liability coverage when they are passengers in automobiles of
New York registry. As insurance follows the car a reasonable expectation would
be that the ability to recover for injury likewise is stable rather than
fluctuating.
There appears to be no convincing argument that would sustain the
relevancy of the Ontario guest statute to defeat liability which would have
accrued under the law of New York. Defendant's testator could not have
relied on the circumstances to its disadvantage. An insurance company has
the ultimate financial interest and as to it dismissal will be a windfall.
Furthermore, any trend in recovery that might be attributed to sustaining
actions such as this can be accounted for 'by the actuarial process. 74 If the
result required a change in rates the change would occur in the assured's
Rochester territory, not Ontario.75 It seems more equitable to face the possibility
that some New York residents may have to pay a little more for their
insurance than to deny automobile guests a cause of action that would have
been theirs but for the guest statute of another forum. "One purpose, at least,
of a conflict-of-laws system is, or should be, to effectuate the policies of the
states concerned." 7 6 Granted in this case the court cannot look to the New
York Constitution as it did in Kilberg77 for evidence of public policy, but the
72. Id. at 35-36, analyzing the possibilities suggested by Justice Halpern.
73. Instant case at 699, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
74. See generally Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 Yale L.J. 554 (1961).
75. "It is important to keep in mind that these territories are aggregates of assureds,
not aggregates of claimants or accidents. Thus, [in the actuarial process a claim is allocated
to the assured's] ...territory even if the accident giving rise to the claim was outside
the territory, the claimant resided outside the territory, or suit was brought in a remote
jurisdiction." Id. at 565. See also id. at 567-69 (auto liability rates).
76. Currie. supra note 71, at 12.
77. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 39-40, 172 N.E.2d 526, 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 136 (1961).
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Legislature's several refusals to enact a guest statute in New York indicate
its unwillingness to yield to the lobbying of liability insurance companies on
78
that consideration.
From an Ontario point of view it is true that there usually would be an

interest warranting some policy application by virtue of the fact that a wrong
occurred there. Among the possible interests might be discouragement of

particular conduct and protection of local creditors as well as the victim's
financial security. In the instant case, however, these seem unimportant to

Ontario. The purpose of the guest statute protects insurance companies rather
than individuals and, as has been previously indicated, the injury caused by

a New York car is irrelevant to Ontario insurance premiums30 It can not be
thought that the statute will have a deterrent effect on negligent driving
because it protects the driver when liability insurance is absent and otherwise
protects the insurance company. The individual put at a disadvantage is the
80
guest, normally having little control over the driver.
From a consideration of these factors it seems clear that substantial justice

has not been done. The case is similar to Grant v. McAuliffe 5 l in that under
the circumstances, the policy at the place of the wrong is irrelevant.8 2 There
a rational result was achieved by applying the law of the California forum on

the issue of survival of a personal injury action after the tortfeasor's death.
Although it might be well for the court to take cognizance of that case, a
decision for reversal in the instant case will probably have to contend with at
least two previous New York decisions.8 3 Neither the opinion in Jesselson
v. Moody nor that in Metcalf v. Reynolds indicates the residency of the
78.

See instant case at 696, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 117.

These acts (in slightly more than half the states] have been the result of persistent lobbying on the part of liability insurance companies. One argument advanced
in support of them is that in guest cases the insurance company, which is required to
pay the damages, is peculiarly exposed to collusion between the injured guest
and a host anxious to see compensation paid-so that the truth does not come out
in court, and there is a resulting increase in insurance rates . . . .Whether this is
a good social policy is at least debatable.
Prosser & Smith, Cases on Torts 215 (3d ed. 1962). See also 2 Harpur & James, Torts 961
(1956). See generally Prosser & Smith, op. cit. supra at 214-16 (discussing guest statutes
in the United States).
79. See Robinette, Ontario, Survey of Canadian Legislation, 1 U. Toronto L.J. 364,

365 (1936) (indicating that the Ontario statute was motivated by considerations like those
underlying similar statutes in the United States).

80. When an employer drove his employee to get her belongings, as a condition to

retaining her services, it was not regarded as a use pursuant to the employment contract
and recovery was precluded. Jurasits v. Nemes, 8 D.L.R.2d 659, [1957] Ont, Weekly N.
166 (CA. 1957). However, the statute has been held not applicable to a baby sitter killed
while being taken home by her employer with whom there was an agreement for carriage.
Dorosz v. Koch, [1961] Ont. 442, 28 D.L.R.2d 171 (H.C.), affd, (19621 Ont. 105, 31
D.L.R.2d 139 (C.A. 1961).
81. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
82. See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict
of Laws, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205 (1958) (discussing Grant v. McAuliffe).
83. See Jesselson v. Moody, 309 N.Y. 148, 127 N.E.2d 921 (1955); Metcalf v.
Reynolds, 267 N.Y. 52, 195 N.E. 681 (1935). Compare Sellers v. Smith, 4 N.Y.2d 412, 151
N.E.2d 838, 176 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1958); Smith v. Clute, 277 N.Y. 407, 14 N.E.2d 455 (1938);
Miranda v. LoCurto, 249 N.Y. 191, 163 N.E. 557 (1928) (per curiam).
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parties or the registry of the car, however. It seems, therefore, that the Court
of Appeals should not find that the weight of past decision precludes it from
a reasoned approach to the facts in the instant case.
If in Kilberg the Court of Appeals effected for the victim of an airplane
crash a result that was consistent with its policy, there would seem to be no
reason why the same measure of justice should not be extended to victims
of other accidents occurring without the state, at least when the interests of
New York outweigh the interests of the foreign jurisdiction as greatly as they
did in Kilberg. It seems that Judge Fuld, at least, would be receptive to an
argument for reversal in Babcock because of his opinion in Kilberg.84 He
favored "the most significant contact or contacts" approach but considered
himself bound by the weight of prior decisions to the contrary in wrongful
death cases. Such precedent has not been established in actions for commonlaw negligence like Babcock.85 Admittedly, Kilberg has been rendered inscrutable by Davenport v. Webb. Nevertheless, the Kilberg decision arrives at
a just result and the equities seem to justify a proliferation that will reverse
and reinstate the complaint in Babcock.
JOHN

OBSCENITY IN

NEw YoRK:

0.

DELAMATER

LAW, FACT-OR BOTH?

A number of cases in recent years have defined, redefined and refined
the tests of what constitutes actionable obscenity in printed matter under
state and federal obscenity statutes.' Two fundamental problems form the
core of the need for such constant adjustment (1) the necessarily vague construction of most of the relevant statutes; 2 and (2) the delicate distinctions
imposed in striking a balance between objectionable pornography and freedom
of artistic expression. 3 The decision that has had the broadest effect upon
each of these considerations, if volume of interpretive and critical comment
84. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 42, 172 N.E.2d 526, 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 138 (1961) (separate
opinion). Judge Fuld concurred with the majority on affirmance of the judgment dismissing
the cause of action premised on contract but was opposed to deciding any other issue.
85. On the theory of lex loci contractus New York law has been applied in an action
against a carrier in order to avoid a Pennsylvania statute limiting recovery. Dyke v. Erie
Ry., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871).
1. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; Alberts v. California, 354 U.S.
476 (1957); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); People v. Richmond County News,
9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961).
2. Roth v. United States, supra note 1, at 495 (concurring opinion of Warren, CJ.);
Id. at 498-500 (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.); Hayes, Survey of a Decade of Decisions
on the Law oj Obscenity, 8 Catholic Lawyer 93, 95 (1962); see generally Alpert, Judicial
Censorship of Obscene Literature, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 70-73 (1938).
3. Roth v. United States, supra note 1, at 491; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 31
U.S.L. Week 4192, 4194 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1963); Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity in the
Courts, 20 Law and Contemp. Problems 587, 587 (1955); Lockhart and McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 295, 368, 373 (1955);
see generally Alpert, supra note 2, at 70-73.

